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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
P R U D E N T I A L F E D E R A L SAV- \ 
I N G S & LOAN ASSOCIATION, \ 
a corporation,
 Piaintif and Appellant. 
vs. I 
F R A N K H. F U L L M E R , , D A V I D / 
H . F U L L M E R and W I L L A R D f 
L. F U L L M E R , JR. , individually, I 
and as co-partners doing business \ Case No. 
under the name and style of F U L L - / 10258 
M E R BROS., a co-partnership; I 
W I L L I A M L. P E R E I R A , doing 1 
business as W I L L I A M P E R E I R A 1 
& A S S O C I A T E S ; W I L L I A M L. I 
P E R E I R A & ASSOCIATES, a 
corporation; and A L L E N S T E E L I 
COMPANY, a corporation, / 
Defendants and Respondent. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF A CASE 
Three purported services of summons were made 
by plaintiff-appellant, Prudential Federal Savings and 
1 
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Loan Association, a corporation, hereinafter referred 
to as Prudential or Appellant, on William L. Pereira 
& Associates, a corporation, the architect for Pruden-
tial's new Salt Lake City bank building, hereinafter 
referred to as Pereira or Respondent. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The court below, after considering affidavits filed 
by both parties, extensive arguments, and statements 
of counsel for both parties in open court, entered its 
amended judgment on October 26, 1964, quashing all 
three services pursuant to Pereira's motions pertaining 
to all three services. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent, Pereira, seeks affirmance of the judg-
ment of the court quashing the purported services of 
summons upon it and, further, by way of cross appeal, 
seeks to reverse the determination of the court below 
that Respondent, Pereira, was doing business in the 
State of Utah and the determination of the court that 
the departure of Pereira's representative, James S. 
Manning, from Salt Lake City, Utah, on or about 
June 10, 1964, was motivated in part by a desire on 
the part of the corporate defendant architect not to 
be served in the prospective Prudential lawsuit. 
2 
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S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
Appellant has complicated this appeal and burdened 
the record herein by designating numerous pleadings, 
items, etc., in the file below which are in no way relative 
to any of the issues on appeal, and in its purported 
statement of facts makes reference to numerous un-
supported allegations in its complaint and, further, 
makes reference to certain alleged portions of Pereira's 
architect contract which are not properly before the 
court. This matter was decided in the court below upon 
(1) affidavits submitted to the court by both parties 
below, (2) on the extensive arguments to the court 
at the time of the hearing on Respondent-Pereira's 
motions to quash, and (3) by statements of counsel 
made to the court during discussion of the issues in-
volved at the time of the hearing. Appellant should 
not cite certain allegations in its complaint referring, 
for example, to claimed errors in design, construction 
and fabrication, etc., in an apparent attempt to color 
its version of the matter when, in fact, such allegations 
are wholly unsupported by any evidence and had nothing 
to do with the determination of the court below that 
the purported service of summons in this case were 
invalid. 
This matter was submitted to the court, except for 
statements and arguments of counsel at the time of 
hearing, solely on the affidavits of the parties involved. 
The court determined which affidavits it would believe 
and entered its judgment accordingly and the state-
3 
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ment of facts herein should properly be confined to those 
matters. Accordingly, Respondent's statement of facts 
will confine itself to those matters properly in the 
record and properly before the court. 
At the outset of the hearing, counsel stipulated 
(R. 10) that the corporate defendant was the only 
defendant involved in this case and that all motions 
to quash as to William L. Pereira, personally, be 
granted. 
The affidavit of William L. Pereira, Respondent's 
president, commencing at R. 121, shows the following 
things: Since the inception of defendant corporation 
(R. 122) it has been engaged with approximately one 
hundred seventy-five architectural projects, only six of 
which have been out of the State of California. Two 
of such out-of-state projects are those of Appellant-
Prudential, namely the building in Salt Lake City in 
question, and another bank building of Prudential at 
Butte, Montana. Another of the six out-of-state projects 
was in connection with a proposal that Pereira design 
a personal home for Mr. Gene Donovan, Prudential's 
president, which project never materialized. A fourth 
out-of-state project was a building for Brigham Young 
University at Provo, Utah. 
In connection with the work done out of the State 
of California by Pereira, the evidence shows (R. 122) 
that except for periodic visits to the site or other super-
visory services, the services of Pereira are performed at 
its offices in Southern California. The architectural 
4 
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employment in connection with the Prudential building 
in Salt Lake City, Utah, was solicited by Appellant-
Prudential in the offices of Pereira in Los Angeles, 
California, by Mr. Thomas Taylor, a senior officer of 
Prudential (R. 123), who made a trip to Los Angeles 
for that purpose. 
The architect's agreement and the amendment 
thereto involved in this case were prepared in Los 
Angeles, California. 
At Prudential's request (R. 123), one of Pereira's 
employees, James S. Manning, was stationed at Salt 
Lake City during the construction phase of Appellant's 
building; the office space in which to conduct and per-
form the duties of Pereira was provided to Mr. Manning 
without charge by Prudential. Said office was not used 
for conducting any of the business of Pereira whatso-
ever in connection with the Prudential building at Salt 
Lake City and incidentally, in connection with the 
engagement of Pereira with respect to the Brigham 
Young University building (R. 123). (See also Mr. 
Manning's affidavit R. 31.) Except for Appellant's 
request (R. 123, 124) no employee of Pereira's would 
have been stationed in Salt Lake City during the con-
struction phase of Prudential's building and no em-
ployee of Pereira's would have been stationed in the 
State of Utah in connection with the Brigham Young 
University building. 
The Pereira affidavit further shows that its repre-
sentative, Mr. James S. Manning, did not solicit or 
5 
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have the authority to solicit any business on behalf of 
Pereira in Salt Lake City. 
Finally, the affidavit shows that at the times that 
the purported services of process were made upon both 
Mr. Manning and Mr. Mooney neither of such persons 
was the managing agent, chief clerk, or other agent or 
person having the management, direction, or control 
of any property of defendant corporation within the 
State of Utah, nor were either of such persons in charge 
of any office or any place of business of Respondent-
Pereira within the State of Utah. 
S T A T E M E N T OF F A C T S C O N C E R N I N G 
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E OF SUMMONS U P -
ON J A M E S S. M A N N I N G . 
The facts with respect to the service of summons 
on Mr. Manning are found in two affidavits, the first 
at R. 29, et seq., and the second at R. 147, et seq. We 
will summarize in substance the facts as set forth in 
two affidavits. As will be pointed out in more detail 
later during the Argument, the affidavits filed by Pru-
dential do not controvert the allegations of these affi-
davits of Mr. Manning nor in most instances even meet 
the issue head-on. A careful examination of the Pru-
dential affidavits will show that for the most part, they 
neatly evade the critical statement of facts contained 
in Mr. Manning's affidavits. The Prudential building 
was substantially finished in May, 1964, (R. 147, et 
seq.) In the third week of May, Prudential's book-
6 
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keeping department and personnel occupied the fourth 
floor of the new building. All remaining personnel 
occupied the building by the end of May, 1964. Pru-
dential began the operation of its business in the new 
building in the first week in June, 1964. All items 
involving the duties of supervision on the part of the 
architect were completed on or before June 11, 1964, 
and Pereira's representative, Mr. Manning, had re-
turned to Los Angeles, California. Only administrative 
detail and verification of accounts and verification and 
completion of certain punch list items remained to be 
done after June 11, 1964, and Mr. Manning, Pereira's 
representative on the job, was in California performing 
other duties for Pereira which had nothing to do with 
the Prudential job. Mr. Manning was in Los Angeles, 
California, (R. 31, et seq.) at the time he received the 
critical phone call from Mr. Joseph D. Kershisnik, the 
administrative assistant to Mr. Gene Donovan, the 
president of Prudential. In this phone call, Mr. Ker-
shisnik (at the very time he was consulting with Pru-
dential's lawyers as Mr. Kershisnik's and Mr. Staten's 
affidavits will show) told Mr. Manning that a crisis 
existed in Salt Lake City. That failures of the con-
tractor gave Prudential fears that the building would 
not be ready for the public opening—that the presence 
of Mr. Manning was absolutely necessary and imme-
diately required. Because of these representations, none 
of which were true, Mr. Manning agreed to rearrange 
his own pressing work schedule in Los Angeles and 
come to Salt Lake City the following day. Mr. Ker-
7 
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shisnik agreed that he would arrange a meeting with 
the various people concerned to deal with the so-called 
crisis. At 8:00 o'clock p.m. the next evening, on June 
24, 1964, Mr. Manning arrived in Salt Lake City 
pursuant to the urgent request and representations of 
Mr. Kershisnik. At that time Mr. Manning was told 
by Mr. Kershisnik that he, Kershisnik, did not feel like 
working that evening and therefore the meeting had 
been cancelled. Now that Mr. Manning was in Salt 
Lake City, no mention was made by Mr. Kershisnik 
concerning matters of a critical nature, nor did he men-
tion anything about the urgent earlier request for Mr. 
Manning to come immediately to Salt Lake City. Mr. 
Kershisnik then stated that he would come to Mr. 
Manning's hotel room, in the Hotel Utah, the follow-
ing morning at 7:00 o'clock a.m., June 25, 1964, at 
which time a pre-meeting would be had prior to the 
meeting with the contractor. The next morning, June 
25, 1964, Mr. Kershisnik did not arrive at 7:00 a.m., 
but did arrive at Mr. Manning's hotel room at approxi-
mately 8:15 a.m. Immediately upon entering the room, 
Mr. Kershisnik stated to Mr. Manning that he had 
to call his office and then made a phone call. About 
fifteen minutes later a knock was heard on the door 
of Mr. Manning's hotel room and Mr. Earl Staten, 
Prudential's attorney, and a Deputy Sheriff entered 
the hotel room and served Mr. Manning the summons 
and complaint in question herein. Mr. Kershisnik then 
assured Mr. Manning that he knew nothing of the 
filing of the complaint or the intention to serve process 
8 
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that morning in the hotel room, which statements were 
not true. 
Mr. Manning then left the hotel and went over 
to the Prudential building site in order to deal with 
the so-called crisis that had induced him to come to Salt 
Lake City. When they got to the job site, Mr. Ker-
shisnik advised that the project engineer would not 
even be there. An examination of the job and a dis-
cussion with one of the contractor's representatives 
later that day, June 25, revealed that in truth and faci 
there was no crisis and no critical matters required 
the presence of Mr. Manning in Salt Lake City. Mr. 
Manning was not required to nor requested to perform 
any supervision or make any decision. I t was perfectly 
obvious and apparent that there was no necessity what-
ever for Mr. Manning's presence there at that time. 
Therefore, Mr. Manning left the night of June 25, 
1964, and returned to Los Angeles, California. The 
sole accomplishment of the trip had been the service 
of summons and complaint upon Mr. Manning in the 
hotel room. The very next day, Mr. Manning received 
a phone call from Mr. Donovan, Prudential's president, 
and during the conversation, Mr. Donovan remarked, 
" I hear my people were playing cops and robbers with 
you yesterday". 
Later on, the last part of June, 1964, during a 
dinner, Mr. Kershisnik admitted to Mr. Manning that 
he had misinformed Mr. Manning in the hotel room on 
the morning of the service when he, Kershisnik, had said 
9 
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that he had no prior knowledge of the filing of the com-
plaint or that service was to be made on Mr. Manning. 
These are the true facts surrounding the service 
on Mr. Manning. As will be demonstrated under our 
Argument later, they are not fairly met or denied. The 
counter affidavits of Prudential are an involved, eva-
sive, circuitous dissertation upon all sorts of happen-
ings and do not meet the plain truth of the facts as 
stated in the affidavits of Mr. Manning. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S C O N C E R N I N G 
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E OF SUMMONS ON 
T H E S E C R E T A R Y O F S T A T E O F U T A H . 
On June 30, 1964, the summons and a copy of 
the complaint were served upon the Secretary of State 
of Utah. Respondent-Pereira's motion to quash did go 
to this summons as well as the summons on Mr. Man-
ning and at the outset of the hearing before Judge 
Ellett it was definitely stated that three service of sum-
mons were involved—that on Mr. Manning, the Sec-
retary of State, and Mr. Mooney. I t is true that no 
further evidence or discussion was had at the hearing 
with respect to this service, but it was obvious to the 
trial court that this service on the Secretary of State 
was not authorized in any way under Utah law or 
procedure. Appellant now makes a big issue about this 
service, which will be met by Respondent's Argument 
later herein. 
10 
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S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS C O N C E R N I N G 
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E OF SUMMONS ON 
G E O R G E W. MOONEY. 
On July 29, 1964, after Respondent-Pereira's 
motions to quash had been filed and were pending be-
fore the court, Prudential caused service of summons 
and complaint to be made upon George W. Mooney. 
The affidavit of Mr. Mooney (R. 118 et seq.) shows 
that Mr. Mooney was not and had never been an officer 
or director or managing or general agent of Pereira, 
nor an agent authorized by appointment or by law 
to receive service of process, nor was he a managing 
agent, chief clerk, or other agent or person having the 
management, direction or control of any property of 
Pereira within the State of Utah, nor was he in charge 
of any office or any place of business of Pereira within 
the State of Utah, Rule 4(e), (4). The only reason 
Mr. Mooney was at the job site was that Pru-
dential had requested Pereira's help on certain problems 
that had arisen with respect to the air-conditioning 
system and during these discussions, Mr. Earl Staten 
and a Deputy Sheriff appeared and threw the summons 
and complaint on the floor and then left. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
U N D E R U T A H L A W , T H E A C T I V I T I E S 
OF R E S P O N D E N T - P E R E I R A I N T H I S CASE 
11 
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D I D NOT C O N S T I T U T E D O I N G B U S I N E S S 
I N T H E S T A T E OF U T A H A N D P E R E I R A 
W A S NOT D O I N G B U S I N E S S I N T H E 
S T A T E O F U T A H A T T H E T I M E O F T H E 
P U R P O R T E D S E R V I C E S I N Q U E S T I O N 
H E R E I N . 
The trial judge correctly quashed the three 
purported services involved in this case. However, in 
his amended judgment of October, 1964, he found in 
Paragraph 1 thereof (R. 155) that at all times herein 
pertinent the corporate defendant Pereira was doing 
business in the State of Utah. Respondent believes that 
the court was in error in this determinatoin and has 
cross appealed from that erroneous determination. 
We do not believe that the Respondent-Pereira 
was ever at any time herein pertinent "doing business" 
in the State of Utah and if we are correct in this judg-
ment, none of the purported services of summons meet 
the requirements of Rule 4(e), (4), U.R.C.P. and this 
appeal can be disposed of accordingly. 
The question of whether or not a foreign corpo-
ration is doing business in a given state for jurisdictional 
purposes is a question of state law. I t is of no help, 
as Appellant has done heretofore in this case, to cite 
all kinds of decisions from other states. There are 
hundreds of decisions from other states which are no 
help at all in this question. We intend to confine our 
discussions on this question as to the cases that have 
been decided by the Utah Supreme Court. 
12 
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In the case of Marchant, et al. vs. National Reserve 
Company of America, et al, 137 P . 2d 331, 103 U. 530, 
the court makes a comprehensive review of prior Utah 
decisions and summarizes the Utah law at Page 338 
of the Pacific Reporter as follows: 
"To summarize, then, the law may be stated 
to be, from the foregoing decisions, that to be 
'doing business' in a state, a corporatoin must 
be engaged in a continuing course of business, 
rather than a few isolated transactions, whether 
those transactions are within the usual scope of 
that corporation's business or not. There must 
be at least some permanence about the presence 
and business transactions of the corporation with-
in the state." 
According to the decision, such things as listing 
in the telephone directory, having its name on the door 
of an office, the presence of a corporation officer on 
personal business in the state, isolated business trans-
actions, in and of themselves do not amount to the 
doing of business. The court states at Page 337 of 
the Pacific Reporter that: 
"I t is thus apparent that it is not any activity 
of a corporation in a state other than its residence 
which will justify the conclusion that it is 'doing 
business' there * * * but it is the combination 
of local activities conducted by such foreign 
corporations—their manner, extent and charac-
ter—which becomes determinative of the juris-
dictional question." 
This principle that a corporation must be engaged 
in a continuing course of business with some permanence 
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about the presence of the business activities within the 
state has never been overruled. 
In Western Gas Appliances, Inc. vs. Servel, Inc., 
257 P . 2d 950, 123 U. 229, the court held that a foreign 
corporation which had no office in this state and limited 
its activities in the State of Utah to occasional sales 
trips, general promotion and supervision of business 
for the purpose of promoting business in general, but 
not for the purpose of consummating particular sales, 
was not "doing business" in the state. The court stated 
further that even the isolated transaction of installing 
an air-conditioning unit and system would not create 
the status of doing business in Utah. 
In Conn vs. Whitmore, 342 P . 2d 871, 9 U. 2 250, 
the court held that a Utah resident who entered into 
a contract by mail for the purchase of a horse in Illinois 
had not done business in the State of Illinois for the 
purpose of giving the Illinois court jurisdiction over 
him. The court stated at Page 874 in the Pacific Re-
porter : 
"Even under the liberalized view the foregoing 
cases represent as to the prerequisites to holding 
one subject to personal jurisdiction of the courts 
of a foreign state, this requirement remains: 
there must be some substantial activity which 
correlates with a purpose to engage in a course 
of business or some continuity of activity in the 
state so that deeming the defendant to be present 
therein is founded upon a realistic basis and is 
not a mere fiction. That this is so and that a 
single act or transaction does not suffice unless 
it fits into the above pattern is well established." 
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In the case of East Coast Discount Corporation 
vs. Reynolds, 325 P . 2d 853, 7 U. 2d 362, the defense 
was asserted that plaintiff corporation had failed to 
qualify to do business in the State of Utah and there-
fore was not entitled to sue in the State of Utah. The 
court held that the acts of sending guaranties to con-
sumers in Utah upon request by the dealer, advertising 
through circulars to persons whose names were sub-
mitted by the dealers, sharing one-half of the expense 
of newspaper advertising, furnishing literature and 
advertising to the dealer, and sending an agent into 
the state when requested by the dealer to make calls 
with the dealer on prospects, would not constitute doing 
business. The court said that this case was not even 
as strong a case for doing business as the Western Gas 
Appliances vs. Servel, Inc., supra. 
In the case before the court, as clearly appears 
by the affidavits of Pereira (It. 121, et seq.), the con-
tract in question for architectural services was entered 
into in California; it was solicited by Appellant-Pru-
dential at the Pereira offices in Los Angeles; all the 
services of Pereira except visits and supervision at the 
site were performed at its offices in Southern Cali-
fornia. In sum and substance what occurred in this 
case was the architectural designs and plans of the 
Prudential building and one other building, that of 
Brigham Young University, were conceived and ex-
ecuted in Los Angeles. The construction of two build-
ings in the State of Utah was not in any sense a con-
tinuity of activity or a permanent establishment of the 
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architect's business in the State of Utah. I t seems to 
us that it is no different from the case of any other 
professional service rendered in the State of Utah by 
out-of-state professional people. A lawyer could come 
to Utah to try one or two cases; a doctor could come 
to the state to perform one or two operations; a high-
way engineering firm could design certain sections of 
the Utah interstate highway and supervise the work 
here. In none of these instances is there anything 
more than a casual, temporary, isolated performance 
of professional services in the State of Utah and the 
activities of the architect, even if they extend over a 
longer period of time as in this case, do not even come 
close to the "doing of business" as set forth in our Utah 
cases because there is no continuity of the architect's 
business, no intent or attempt at all to permanently 
engage in the profession in Utah. Appellant makes 
much of the fact that a resident architect was stationed 
here during the construction phase of the building. I t 
must be remembered that it was only as an accommo-
dation to the Appellant and at Appellant's request. 
Had it not been for this request, there would only have 
been periodic site visitations as in the normal course 
of performing architectural duties. 
In any event, the second affidavit of Mr. Manning 
(R. 147, et seq.), (see also affidavit of Betty Earl, 
R. 144) shows that all phases of work requiring on-
site supervision by the achitect were completed before 
he ever left Utah on June 11, 1964. Appellant, by 
citing numerous provisions of its complaint and alleged 
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contracts in force in this case, none of which were before 
the court below in connection with the hearing on this 
matter, makes all kinds of conclusions and judgments 
with respect to the construction of said contracts. Appel-
lant then "rules" that the duties of the architect required 
his presence in Salt Lake City on or after J u n e 11, 
1964. The affidavit of Mr. Manning (R. 147) shows 
the opposite to be the fact. Fo r example, on Page 24 
of its brief, Appellant makes the statement that de-
fendant (Pereira) was contractually "bound to offer 
such supervision during the entire construction period 
whether or not defendant thought such supervision was 
required. I t was the defendant who breached this con-
tract by removing the fulltime supervision from Salt 
Lake City, etc." W h a t a gratuitous misstatement this 
is. I n the first place, these questions of construction 
of the architect's agreement were not before the court 
below, but even if they had been the contract clearly 
provides (R. 78) in sub-paragraph (c) of Paragraph 
5 of Page 2 of the contract as follows: 
"The architect and owner agree that the archi-
tect's full time supervision is necessary . . . dur-
ing the construction period; and . . . a qualified 
superintendent shall reside in Salt Lake City 
during the construction period." 
The affidavit of Mr. Manning clearly shows that 
the construction period was over. Appellant , on Page 
24 of its brief, tells this court that such supervision 
was required during the ENTIRE construction period, 
meaning by this—until the last bill is paid and the final 
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certificate furnished. Thus completely changing the 
meaning of the contract as written and then attempt 
to offer that misstatement to the court as evidence that 
the architect breached his agreement. 
The physical presence of Mr. Manning, Pereira's 
representative, in Salt Lake City seems to be the main 
basis for Appellant's claim that Pereira was doing 
business in the State of Utah and if that physical pres-
ence is a crucial factor, which Respondent disputes, 
then that argument itself fails because at the time 
of all services of summons in question in this case, 
Pereira's representative was no longer stationed in Salt 
Lake City, nor was there any necessity for his presence 
here. 
Respondent also wishes to point out that there is 
no support anywhere in this record for the court's 
finding in Paragraph 2 of its amended judgment (R. 
156) that "James S. Manning's departure from Salt 
Lake City, Utah, on or about June 11, 1964, was moti-
vated in part by a desire on the part of the corporate 
defendant architect not to be served in the prospective 
Prudential lawsuit." The second affidavit of Mr. Man-
ning (R. 147) clearly shows the reasons for his return 
to California. 
For the reasons herein stated, Respondent believes 
that this court should reverse the trial court's determi-
nation that Pereira was "doing business" in the State 
of Utah. 
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P O I N T I I . 
T H E J U D G M E N T Q U A S H I N G SERVICE 
OF SUMMONS ON MR. J A M E S S. M A N N I N G 
IS CORRECT. 
In its motion to quash (R. 27) Respondent alleged 
that the purported service of summons on Mr. Manning 
was obtained by fraud, trick, artifice, or deceit, or by 
inveighling or enticing one James S. Manning into the 
State of Utah for the purpose of attempting service 
of process in this case or by taking sharp advantage 
of the presence of the said James S. Manning in the 
State of Utah. Respondent further * alleged in Para-
graph 4 of said motion that the defendant had not 
been properly served with process in this action in any 
manner whatever, nor in accordance with the provi-
sions of Rule 4(e)(4) U.R.C.P. The court in the 
judgment of October 26, 1964, (R. 157) found that 
the allegations of Paragraph 1 and 4 of the motion 
to quash were sustained. The court further found spe-
cifically in Paragraph 6 of its amended judgment that 
the purported service of summons on one James S. 
Manning is void for the reason that the said James 
S. Manning was induced to enter the State of Utah 
by plaintiff on or about June 25, 1964, for the sole 
purpose on part of plaintiff of obtaining service of 
summons and complaint on the said James S. Manning. 
Besides the statements and arguments of counsel made 
to the court at the hearing, the court had before it on 
this question the two affidavits of James S. Manning 
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(R. 29, 147). Also, the affidavits of Gene Donovan 
(R. 96), Joseph D. Kershisnik (R. 103), Earl P . 
Staten (R. 112), and Franklin Riter (R. 129). The 
two affidavits of Mr. Manning are concise, factual, 
clear and short. The opposing affidavits of Mr. Dono-
van, Mr. Kershisnik, Mr. Staten and Mr. Riter are 
long, diffuse, vague, and irrelevant, and repeatedly use, 
in substance, such phrases on the part of affiant as: 
" I t was affiant's understanding"; "Affiant was ad-
vised"; "I t was indicated to affiant"; and "Affiant 
believes". The opposing affidavits do not squarely 
meet the factual, simple allegations of the affidavits 
of Mr. Manning. Instead, they attempt to set forth 
a confusing narrative concerning the drafting of Pru-
dential's complaint and other irrelevant matters. The 
affidavits are full of conclusions as to the meaning of 
certain contract documents, certain duties and obliga-
tions of the architect, none of which have any relevance 
to the question at issue at all. 
In one important particular of Appellant's affidavits 
submitted to the court below there is a serious conflict 
between affidavits. Prudential's various affidavits all 
make reference to a conference on the morning of June 
24, 1964, wherein it is claimed that the final draft of 
the complaint was being worked out. The affidavits 
all say in sum and substance that Mr. Joseph Kershisnik 
was called into this morning meeting and that that was 
the time that all the attorneys first knew of Mr. Man-
ning's anticipated trip to Salt Lake City. In the affi-
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davit of Mr. Staten, on the eighth line of Paragraph 
5 (R. 114), he states as follows: 
"Mr. Kershisnik was then called into the meet-
ing and questioned as to the exact arrival time 
for Mr. Manning and he indicated that he under-
stood Mr. Manning would be arriving on an eve-
ning plane from Los Angeles. He stated that he 
had talked to Mr. Manning T H A T MORN-
I N G to confirm the prospective arrival, etc." 
In Mr. Kershisnik's affidavit with reference to 
this very point, stated, commencing at line four, Para-
graph 9 of the Kershisnik affidavit (R. 10$that: 
"Later in the morning of June 24, affiant was 
called into conference between Mr. Donovan 
and the company's attorneys and first became 
aware that a complaint had been prepared in 
final form and that attempts would be made to 
serve Mr. Manning while he was in Salt Lake 
City. Affiant was requested to call Mr. Manning 
again and verifv that he would becoming to Salt 
Lake City that evening W H I C H A F F I A N T 
D I D , etc." 
Not only is this a direct admission by Mr. Kershisnik 
that he knew that a final complaint had been drafted 
and that service would be made and thereafter called 
Mr. Manning and continued the inducement to come 
to Salt Lake, but it also is a conflicting story as to 
when the alleged phone call was made as compared 
with the statement in Mr. Staten's affidavits. 
After all the lengthy affidavits of Appellant have 
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been read and re-read, these simple facts remain appar-
ent and uncontradicted: 
1. The construction period of the contract was 
over. Supervision of the architect was no longer re-
quired on the job and he had left Salt Lake City and 
returned to Los Angeles on June 11, 1964. 
2. The architect's representative, Mr. Manning, 
was induced to return to Salt Lake City by Prudential's 
Mr. Joseph Kershisnik because an alleged situation of 
great urgency and crisis required his presence. 
3. As a result of these representations, Mr. Man-
ning did return to Salt Lake City. 
4. There was no crisis or urgent situation requiring 
Mr. Manning's presence in Salt Lake City. 
5. The net and only result of Mr. Manning's visit 
to Salt Lake City on June 25, 1964, at the request and 
inducement of Mr. Kershisnik, was the service of sum-
mons and complaint in this action. 
Appellant goes to great lengths in its brief under 
its Point I and cites many cases in an attempt to show 
that the fine points of fraud with respect to the entice-
ment question on Mr. Manning's service were not met 
according to the cases that they cite. Respondent believes 
that an analysis of the cases cited on this point by 
Appellant is not necessary. The trial judge was entitled 
to and did believe the affidavits of Mr. Manning. These 
affidavits, as we have pointed out, are not really met 
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by the counter affidavits of Appellant. The facts of the 
affidavits of Mr. Manning and the minimum logical 
inferences which must be drawn from them, easily meet 
the most exacting requirements of the fraud and entice-
ment cases. Be this as it may, the situation in this case 
as found by the trial judge is clearly within the prin-
ciples of immunity established by this court in Western 
States Refining Company vs. Berry, 313 P.2d 480, 
6 U. 2d 336. The court in the Berry case stated that it 
was of the opinion that: 
"A showing of actual fraudulent intent and 
misrepresentation is not necessary in order to 
void service of process in cases of this type." 
Appellant attempts to limit the Berry case to settle-
ment negotiations. We believe that the holding of the 
court goes further and that the principal of the Berry 
case is, as stated in the language of the opinion: 
"Equity and good conscience will not permit 
plaintiff to take sharp advantage of defendant's 
presence in the jurisdiction so long as defendant 
is in the jurisdiction for the purpose for which 
the plaintiff invited him." 
The facts in this case are also well within the prin-
cipals of Ultcht vs. Ultcht, 96 N.J . Eq. 583, 126 Atl. 
440, cited in the Berry case. In this New Jersey case 
the wife had caused a New Jersey service to be made 
on the husband by taking sharp advantage of his pres-
ence in New Jersey and the court stated: 
"The wife further contends that according to 
her husband's own proof he was constantly pass-
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ing back and forth into this state and that there-
fore his privilege had been waived. I cannot 
agree with this either because while it is true 
as pointed out in Case vs. Smith, 152 Fed. 730, 
that had he been served upon any other visit to 
this state, it would have been effectual, that does 
not in the slightest change the situation where 
the action was taken at a time and place to which 
the husband had been invited (and it makes no 
difference whether expresssly or by implication) 
to attend by the adverse party." 
See also the citations in the Berry case to the follow-
ing authorities, 42 Am. Jur., Process, Sec. 35, and 72 
CJS, Process, Sec. 39. 
Regardless of how this court decides the question 
of whether or not the architect Pereira was "doing busi-
ness" at all in the State of Utah, it is submitted that for 
the reasons herein stated the quashing of service of sum-
mons upon Mr. Manning was correct. 
Appellant also suggests in Point I of its brief 
that since this matter was decided on affidavits by the 
court below that the court can ignore this determination 
and decide the matter anew on the same affidavits. 
Respondent disagrees with this contention. Rule 43(e), 
U.R.C.P. provides as follows: 
"(e) Evidence on Motions. When a motion 
is based on facts not appearing of record the 
court may hear the matter on affidavits presented 
by the respective parties, but the court may direct 
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral 
testimony or depositions." 
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Both Appellant — Prudential and Respondent — 
Pereira appeared at the hearing on this matter in the 
court below with the same persons who executed the 
various affidavits submitted to the court. Both sides 
were prepared to place the witnesses on the stand and 
both sides contended that the matters recited in the re-
spective affidavits were incorrect. The trial judge stated 
that he did not want any oral evidence and would not 
receive any and informed the parties that the matter 
would be considered on affidavits and upon the argu-
ments of counsel to the court. And this is the way the 
matter proceeded. Appellant states, for example, on 
Page 9 of its brief that: 
" I t is highly significant that none of these 
arrangements made by Mr. Manning on June 
21 are in any way denied by defendant." 
Respondent challenges this statement. The court below 
required the parties to submit this matter on affidavits. 
The court decided that it would believe the affidavits 
of Respondent. Respondent stands on its affidavits and 
presentation to the court below. 
P O I N T I I I 
THE COURT'S RULING QUASHING 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON THE SECRE-
TARY OF STATE WAS CORRECT. 
In 1961, the Legislature enacted the Utah Business 
Corporation Act. This Act substantially repealed the 
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earlier corporate enactments. I t adopted for Utah the 
Model Business Corporation Act prepared by the Com-
mittee on Corporate Laws of the American Bar Associ-
ation. Article Four of said Act (16-10-2, etseq.) applies 
to foreign corporations. The Act provides in Sec. 16-
10-102, Utah Code Annotated, that no foreign corpo-
ration shall have the right to transact business in this 
state until it shall have procured a certificate of authority 
to do so from the Secretary of State. The Act further 
provides in 16-10-120, that no foreign corporation trans-
acting business in this state without a certificate of 
authority shall be permitted to maintain any action, 
suit or proceeding in any court of this state until such 
corporation shall have obtained a certificate of author-
ity.*** A foreign corporation which transacts business 
in this state without a certificate of authority shall be 
liable to this state for the years or parts thereof during 
which it transacted business in this state without a certif-
icate of authority, in an amount equal to all fees and 
taxes which would have been imposed by the laws of this 
state upon such corporation had it duly applied for and 
received a certificate of authority *** plus all penalties 
imposed by the laws of this state for failure to pay such 
fees and taxes. Appellant charges that the Respondent-
Pereira herein violated these provisions of the Utah 
Business Corporation Act. After having thus made this 
determination, Appellant then seeks to impose addi-
tional sanctions other than and in addition to those 
provided by the Act itself and, in effect, re-write Sec-
tion 16-10-111 to provide a punishment by way of what 
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Appellant terms an "estoppel." Section 16-10-111 pro-
vides that whenever a corporation authorized to transact 
business in this state (this means, of course, whenever 
a foreign corporation has procured a certificate of 
authority from the Secretary of State) shall violate the 
terms of its authorization certificate and fail to appoint 
or maintain a registered agent in this state or whenever 
any such agent cannot be found within the state or when 
the certificate of authority is revoked, then the Secretary 
of State shall be an agent of such corporation for the 
service of process. Appellant, by virtue of its so-called 
"estoppel" argument, would now have the court amend 
16-10-111 and add in substance the following language: 
"And furthermore if a foreign corporation 
does business or transacts business in the State 
of Utah without securing a certificate of author-
ity from the Secretary of State and without 
designating a registered agent in this state, said 
corporation shall be deemed to have obtained a 
certificate of authority and appointed the Sec-
retary of State a process agent and said corpo-
ration shall be estopped to assert otherwise." 
Not only would it be a perversion of the statute 
itself, it would be an injustice to apply any such doc-
trine of estoppel against Respondent under the facts 
and circumstances of this case. 
Prudential's contention that the service upon the 
Secretary of State is valid is based on a misconception 
of the doctrine of estoppel. I t is also based upon the 
presupposition that Pereira was doing business in the 
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State of Utah (Appellant's brief, Page 13). This sup-
position is denied by Pereira and is the subject of the 
cross appeal presented in Point I of this brief. If the 
court finds Pereira was not doing business in the State 
of Utah, then the issue of the validity of service on the 
Secretary of State becomes moot. Industrial Commis-
sion vs. Kemmerer Coal Company, 150 P . 2d 373, 106 
U. 476. 
As pointed out in Respondent's argument in 
Point I of this brief, the activities of the Respondent 
architect Pereira in this case did not amount to the 
"doing of business" in the State of Utah. Even if the 
court should find against Pereira on this point, it would 
be a clear misapplication of the accepted principles of 
the doctrine of estoppel to reach the result contended 
for by Appellant in its argument in its brief attempting 
to overturn the ruling of the trial court with respect 
to the service on the Secretary of State. 
Estoppel implies that one who by his deed or con-
duct has induced another to act in a particular manner 
will not be permitted to adopt an inconsistent position 
or attitude which thereby causes a loss or injury to the 
other person. 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, Sec. 1, Page 288. 
Decisions by this court relative to the doctrine of 
estoppel support the position that for an estoppel to 
exist there must first be a representation by one party 
and a subsequent reliance by the other upon that rep-
resentation. The case of Kelly vs. Richards, et al, 83 P . 
2d 731, 95 U. 560, says: 
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"This estoppel arises when one by his acts, 
representations or admissions or by his silence 
when he ought to speak out, intentionally or 
through culpable negligence induces another to 
believe certain facts to exist and such other right-
fully relies ^nd acts on such belief, so that he 
will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to 
deny the existence of such facts." Citing 21 C. J . 
p. 1113, 1114, 1115. 
The Court further says: 
" I t is an essential element of estoppel in pais 
that the person involving it relied upon the rep-
resentation or conduct of the other party, was 
influenced in his own conduct by it, and would 
not have acted as he did but for the acts of which 
he now complains." 
See also Tanner vs. Provo Reservoir Company, et 
ah 289 P . 151, 76 U. 335; IXL Stores Company vs. 
Success Markets, 97 P . 2d 577, 98 U. 124; Wellsville 
Eastfield Irrigation Company vs. Lindsay Land and 
Livestock Co., et al, 137 P . 2d 634, 104 U. 448. 
There is nothing in the record of this case to show 
either a representation on the part of Pereira or reliance 
on behalf of Prudential which would invoke the appli-
cation of the doctrine of estoppel. In fact, even if 
Pereira had through word or action indicated to Pru-
dential that it had secured a certificate of authority to 
do business in the State of Utah, Prudential would be 
hard pressed to assert reliance upon these acts when a 
telephone call to the Secretary of State would have 
established whether or not Pereira had secured such a 
certificate. 
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Wein vs. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P . 2d 222, 
relied upon by Appellant in its brief deals with facts 
entirely different from those of this case and is not 
authority that our court has applied the principle of 
estoppel in the situation similar to the one at bar. 
In the Wein vs. Crockett case, appellant was an 
individual who was a resident of the State of California 
and who had entered into a contract with a resident 
of the State of Utah. The action before the court was 
a motion to quash service of summons on an agent of 
appellant and the applicable statute which was being 
construed by the court provided: 
"Section 2. When a non-resident person is 
associated in and conducts business in the State 
of Utah in one or more places in his own name 
or a common trade name and said businesses 
are conducted under the supervision of a man-
ager, superintendent, or agent, said person may 
be sued on any action arising out of the conduct 
of said business in his own name and a summons 
in such cases may be served on said person per-
sonally or may be served upon his manager, 
superintendent, or agent as the case may be as 
provided in Section 104-5-11 (10)." 
"Section 3. Every non-resident person doing 
business as provided in the preceding section 
shall file or cause to be filed a certificate under 
oath with the Secretary of State of the State 
of Utah setting forth the name of and place of 
business of his manager, superintendent, or 
agent upon whom service of summons may be 
had and shall file such certificate setting forth 
the name of said manager, superintendent, or 
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agent on or before the 15th day of January in 
each year with the Secretary of State of Utah." 
The Supreme Court in holding that appellant's 
failure to appoint an agent as provided in Section 3 
would not constitute a defense to a service on an actual 
agent as provided in Section 2 used this language: 
"Plaintiff was required to designate an agent 
on the effective date of the act and his failure to 
comply with the law cannot be used as a reason 
for defeating defendant's right to claim the bene-
fit of the statute. Not having designated an 
agent, plaintiff cannot be heard to complain if 
the agent served is one designated by statute." 
(Emphasis added). 
I t should be noted in the Wein case the court 
used the doctrine of estoppel to permit the resident 
defendant to claim the benefit of the statute. I t was not 
used to bar a party from the right to rely upon the clear 
wording of a statute as Prudential is proposing here. 
With respect to the cases relied upon by Appellant 
in support of its position, it should be noted that three 
of the six cases, Old Wayne Life Association vs. Mc-
Bonough, 204 U.S. 8, 21-22 (1907) ; Flinn vs. Western 
Mutual Life Association, 171 N.W. 711, (Iowa 1919); 
and North American Union vs. Oliphant, 217 S.W. 1 
(Ark. 1919), involve defendants which are foreign in-
surance companies. I t is clear that in the area of insur-
ance, the state has a special interest in protecting its 
citizens as was recently expressed by our Legislature in 
the "Title of Chapter and Purpose of Act" section of the 
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Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, Title 31-35-1, Utah 
Code Annotated, which was passed in the 1963 session. 
I t should also be noted that four of the cases, Old Wayne 
Life Association vs. McDonough, (1907) supra; Flinn 
vs. Western Mutual Life Association (1919) supra; 
North American Union vs. Oliphant, (1919) supra; 
Yoder vs. Nu-Enamel Corporation, (1941), 300 N.W. 
840; predate the Model Business Corporation Act which 
did not even come into existence until 1950. (Model 
Business Corporation Act Annotated, Volume 1, Pre-
face, p. v) , and it is hard to accept that they construe 
statutes which are "substantially identical" to Section 
16-10-111, Utah Code Annotated, as contended by Ap-
pellant. 
Appellant, in contending that Pereira is estopped 
to assert that it was not authorized to do business in the 
State of Utah, implicitly asks the court to presume that 
Pereira was qualified to do business and therefore amen-
able to service under the provisions of Title 16-10-111, 
Utah Code Annotated. Yet Appellant in its own brief 
has asserted that Pereira never obtained the certificate 
of authority to do business in Utah which is the pre-
requisite of being authorized to do business in the state. 
The following statement is found on page 13 of Appel-
lant's brief: 
"Defendant has never procured a certificate 
of authority to do business in Utah as required 
by Section 16-10-102 of the Utah Code. (Pereira 
affidavit R. 121, Paragraph 2; Staten Affidavit 
R. 117, Paragraph 12B) ' \ 
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In the case of Lubrano vs. Imperial Counsel, O.U.S. 
20 R.I. 27, 37 Atl. 345 (1897) the court was pre-
sented with a similar situation and disposed of it as 
follows: . . . . . • ; 
"I t will also be seen that in those cases where 
judgment was rendered by default the return 
on the writ showed a valid service prima facie, 
and nothing was brought upon the record by the 
plaintiff to contradict the same, so that the court 
was fully warranted in exercising its jurisdiction; 
that is to say, the court, having no knowledge 
to the contrary, was bound to presume that the 
defendant had discharged its statutory duty by 
appointing the person therein designating as its 
agent to accept service, and hence that service 
upon such person was good. Here, however, no 
such presumption can be said to arise, in the 
face of the record before us, which shows that, 
as a matter of fact, the defendant had not com-
plied with the statute first above quoted; and 
hence the court cannot stultify itself by holding 
that any such presumption exists. Indeed, it 
would be absurd to say that a presumption arises 
as to the existence of a certain jurisdictional fact 
when the court is judicially informed that it 
does not exist." 
In effect, Appellant is asking the court to presume 
the existence of a fact which by Appellant's own admis-
sion does not exist. I t does not seem relevant to argue 
that Pereira is estopped from asserting his non-compli-
ance with the statutes when Prudential asserts the point 
itself. 
When the Legislature enacted the Utah Business 
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Corporation Act in 1961, it had access to the three-
volume work Model Business Corporation Act Anno-
tated which was a research product of the American Bar 
Foundation, the originators of the Model Business 
Corporation Act. The relevant portion of Title 16-10-
111 is taken directly from Section 108 of the Model 
Business Corporation Act which is found on page 605 
of the Model Business Corporation Act Annotated, 
Vol. 2 and following it is an extensive annotation on this 
Section. 
In reading this annotation, it is clear that the pro-
visions of Section 108 of the Model Business Corpora-
tion Act were never intended to apply to a foreign 
corporation not authorized to do business in the state. 
On page 606 of this Volume, it is pointed out that sev-
eral states which have adopted this section have, in 
addition, added provisions dealing with a foreign corpo-
ration which transacts business without being qualified. 
On page 620 of this Volume, under Comment, the fol-
lowing quotation is found: 
" Section 108 of the Model Act provides for 
the appointment of an agent by a foreign cor-
poration authorized to transact business in the 
State and for service on the Secretary of State 
as agent in any case where the required agent 
is not appointed or cannot be found. I t does 
not limited or affect the right to serve process 
upon a foreign corporation in any other manner 
now or hereafter permitted by law. The effect 
of Section 108 is to leave to other statutes or 
to the common law the question of service of 
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process on foreign corporations which do not 
qualify to transact business in the State" (Em-
phasis added). 
The Utah Legislature having access to this publi-
cation at the time Title 16-10-111 was enacted could 
easily have added an additional provision as did Colo-
rado, North Dakota, Wyoming and Oregon, providing 
that the Secretary of State shall be deemed to be an 
agent for the service of process when the corporation 
transacts business without being qualified. I t did enact 
such a provision with respect to unauthorized foreign 
insurance companies in the 1963 session when it enacted 
Title 31-35-32, Utah Code Annotated, which provides 
that if a foreign insurer, not authorized to do business 
in the State of Utah does engage in business in the State 
of Utah, that such acts on its part shall authorize the 
Insurance Commissioner to be its agent upon whom 
service of process can be made. 
The case of Daoud vs. Kleven, Inv. Company, 
103 Atl. 2d 257, 30 N.J . S.Ct. 38 (1954), is a fairly 
recent opinion dealing with a statute essentially the 
same as the one at bar. In that case the New Jersey court 
stated its position as follows: 
"In addition to the requirement that a foreign 
corporation must be present when service is 
made, there is a second vital requirement, i. e., 
service must be made upon an authorized agent. 
Since a corporation has no actual corporeal ex-
istence but exists only because of a legal fiction, 
it is necessary to effectuate service upon an agent. 
An agent may be an actual agent of such cor-
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poration, or some person so designated by statute 
for the purpose of service. Service as above noted 
was made upon the Secretary of State. 
"There is no provision by way of statute or 
rule designating the Secretary of State an agent 
upon whom process may be served for a foreign 
corporation which is transacting business in this 
state without official authorization theretofore 
had." 
"N.J.S. 2A: 15-26, N.J.S.A., provides in part 
as follows: 
'In addition to any other method of service 
duly provided, process in any action commenced 
in any of the courts of this state against a do-
mestic corporation or a foreign corporation 
authorized to transact business in this state may 
be served upon the Secretary of State or upon 
the chief clerk in his office, when * * *, 
'Service upon the Secretary of State or his 
chief clerk as herein provided shall be had only 
as long as the circumstances authorizing such 
service shall continue.' 
"Patently, this is authority to serve the Sec-
retary of State only when a foreign corporation 
has been authorized to do business in the state, 
and even then, only so long as additional facts 
are extant." 
The court concludes: 
"In light of the foregoing, the service upon 
the Secretary of State is deficient in two par-
ticulars which are basic and vital requirements 
for legal and valid service, i. e., one, the corpo-
ration was not present in the state at the time 
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of the purported service and two, service was 
not had upon an authorized agent of the de-
fendant." 
See also, Winston vs. Idaho Hardwood Company, 
23 Cal. App. 211, 137 P . 601 (1913) ; Equity Life As-
sociation vs. Gammon, 118 Ga. 236, 44 S.E. 987 (1903) ; 
Rothrock vs. Dwelling-House Insurance Company, 161 
Mass. 423, 37 N.E. 206 (1894); Vance vs. Pullman 
Company, 160 F . 707 (1908) ; and Fletcher Cyclopedia 
Corporations, Vol. 18, Ch. 67, Sec. 8742, p. 627, et seq. 
For the reasons herein stated, Respondent submits 
that it is clear that the trial court's ruling quashing 
service of summons on the Secretary of State is correct. 
P O I N T IV 
THE COURT'S RULING QUASHING 
SERVICE OF SUMMONS ON GEORGE W. 
MOONEY WAS CORRECT. 
The court below in its amended judgment of Oc-
tober 26, 1964, (R. 155) sustained Respondent's motion 
to quash the service as to Mr. Mooney on two grounds 
which are pertinent here: first, in Paragraph 4 of its 
order (R. 157) the court found that the allegations of 
Paragraph 3 of Respondent's motion to quash the serv-
ice of summons on Mr. Mooney were sustained; second, 
in Paragraph 7 of said amended judgment the court 
further found that the service on Mr. Mooney was void 
for the reason that the summons was issued and service 
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attempted after Respondent's motion to quash the serv-
ice of summons on Mr. James S. Manning was filed and 
pending before the court and before the court had dis-
posed of said motion to quash. Appellant in its brief 
discusses only the second ruling of the court, namely, 
that the original motion to quash was pending. The 
court's ruling was correct on the basis of either or both 
of the grounds stated in said amended judgment. 
As to the first ground: 
Respondent in Paragraph 3 of its motion to quash 
the service on Mr. Mooney (R. 42) alleged that the 
service on Mr. Mooney was not properly made in any 
manner whatever nor in accordance with the provisions 
of Rule 4(e) (4). The court sustained this allegation. 
This allegation is amply supported by both the affidavits 
of counsel (R. 43) and particularly by the affidavit of 
George W. Mooney (R. 118). Rule 4(e) (4) sets forth 
the manner in which service is accomplished upon a 
corporation not otherwise provided for. The Rule re-
quires service upon an officer, a managing or general 
agent, or any other agent authorized by appointment 
or by law to receive service of process. Or, upon any 
such officer, agent, clerk, cashier, managing agent, chief 
clerk, or other agent having the management or direc-
tion or control of any property of said corporation 
within the state. Or, if the corporate defendant adver-
tises or holds itself out as having an office or place of 
business in this state or does business in this state, then 
upon the person doing such business or in charge of such 
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office or place of business. The affidavits effectively 
disclose that George W. Mooney was not a person pur-
suant to the Rule upon whom service could be made. 
At the most, he was merely in Salt Lake City en route 
to Los Angeles from Butte, Montana, and at the request 
of Prudential was discussing with Prudential certain 
problems which Prudential contended existed with 
respect to the air-conditioning equipment of the new 
Prudential building. There is no showing whatever that 
this was a part of the architect's contract in connection 
with its work on the Prudential building. In a word, 
the record is perfectly clear that Mr. Mooney was simply 
not a proper person upon whom service could be made 
in order to secure jurisdiction of Respondent Pereira. 
See Beard vs. White, Green and Addison, Associates, 
Inc., 336 P . 2d 125, 8 U. 2d 423. 
The court below was also correct in its second 
ground for quashing the service on Mr. Mooney. 
Namely, that the service was attempted while the ori-
ginal motion to quash was still pending before the court 
and before the court had acted thereon. 
At 72 C.J.S., Process, Sec. 21, Page 1019, the 
following statement is made: 
"Issuance by plaintiff or attorney. In a juris-
diction wherein a summons is issued by the plain-
tiff or his attorney, the issuance of one summons 
does not exhaust the power (cites Washington 
case) or prevent the issuance of another sum-
mons; (citing the same Washington case) but 
it has been held that, without leave of court, a 
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second summons cannot properly be issued by 
plaintiff while a motion to quash the first sum-
mons is pending. (Citing the Colorado case of 
Farris vs. Walter, 31 P . 231, 2 Colo. A.P. 450). 
The court below in this case followed the Colorado 
rule. Shepardization of the Farris case reveals that it 
has never been overruled or modified and has been cited 
many times. In this case, a suit was filed to recover on 
a promissory note. The action was commenced (as is 
the Utah practice) by the issuance of a summons in 
substantially the same language as a summons used in 
Utah at the present time. 
In the Farris case defendant appeared specially 
and filed a motion to quash. Thereafter, while the motion 
was pending before the court, the plaintiff issued a 
second summons and due return of the service of this 
summons was made showing it to have been served 
approximately thirty days after the first service. The 
second summons was not attacked nor was any appear-
ance made on the part of defendant in obedience to 
that summons. 
Thereafter, the court denied the motion to quash 
on the first summons and entered judgment. The 
Supreme Court of Colorado reversed, saying that the 
motion to quash should have been granted on the first 
summons and held that judgment cannot properly have 
been entered under the second summons because the 
motion to quash was still pending, even though the 
second summons cured the defect in the first summons. 
The language of the court was as follows: 
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"We are utterly unable to find satisfactory 
reasons which authorize us to say that the de-
fendant in this case was under any obligation 
to appear and answer the complaint in obedience 
to the second summons, while his motion to quash 
was pending, and without any action or admis-
sion on the part of the plaintiff or the court 
indicating the necessity therefor." 
Respondent submits that the Colorado decision 
is the better rule. Judge Ellett in this case felt that the 
court, of necessity, must have the power and the author-
ity to determine legal questions submitted to it without 
any party unilaterally, in effect, requiring the court to 
perform useless adjudications. This would be the precise 
effect of permitting Appellant-Prudential to be upheld 
on the Mooney service. If a party can be permitted to 
serve an additional summons while a motion to quash 
is pending on its first service, there is no reason why they 
could not do it twice, or three, or four times, or, in fact, 
have seven summones pending before all divisions of the 
court on motions to quash. They could have the court at 
work determining questions made moot by plaintiff's 
unilateral action. I t seems to Respondent that the serv-
ice of further process while the validity of the first proc-
ess is already in issue before the court amounts to an 
interference with the court's orderly disposition of mat-
ters before it. 
In any event, Respondent submits that the Wash-
ington case cited by C.J.S. and the cases cited by Appel-
lant in its brief are not in point with the situation at 
bar. The F arris case is squarely in point with the case 
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at bar and no case exists contrary to the Colorado 
court's determination on this question. 
Respondent submits that the quashing of the service 
on Mr. Mooney should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The activities of the Respondent architect Pereira 
in this case did not constitute the "doing of business" 
within the State of Utah within the meaning of the cases 
heretofore cited by the Utah court. Regardless of the 
court's determination tm this point, the rulings of the 
trial court quashing each of the services of summons 
in question herein was correct and is supported by the 
record. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Shirley P . Jones, J r . 
411 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for 
Defendant and Respondent 
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